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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COORT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case. No. 
Category No. 13 
vs. : 
CHAD A. GARDINER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2-2(3)(a) in that this is an appeal from a memorandum 
decision and judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming 
defendant's convictions for assaulting a peace officer and 
interfering with a police officer. Defendant was previously 
convicted in the Eighth Circuit Court after bench trial of 
assaulting a peace officer in violation of S76-5-102.4 and 
interfering with a police officer in violation of §76-8-305. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held, sua 
sponte, that defendant can be convicted of assaulting and 
interfering with a peace officer when the defendant resisted a 
forcible search and arrest that the Court of Appeals held 
violated defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution? 
2. Did the officer's warrantless entry into the 
Dinaland Aviation building by force violate defendant's rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure and constitute an 
illegal entry and search? 
A. Is the Dinaland Aviation hanger protected by 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I S14 of the Utah Constitution? 
B. Did the State meets its burden of proof in 
establishing the existence of exigent circumstances sufficient 
to justify the warrantless entry into the building by force? 
C. Was the officer acting within the scope of 
his authority when he shoved the defendant out of the way to 
gain entrance to the building? 
3. Is the trial court's finding that the officer did 
not use excessive force to gain entrance to the premises 
clearly erroneous? 
4. Did the officer's use of excessive force entitle 
defendant to resist the officer's unlawful entrance into the 
building? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Chad Gardiner is the son of John 
Gardiner, owner of Dinaland Aviation in Vernal, Utah. (TR 49, 
lines 18-20) John Gardiner leases the Dinaland Aviation 
hanger from Uintah County and Vernal City on a twenty year 
lease* 
2. On the 16th day of April 1988 John Gardiner gave 
defendant permission to have a party at the Dinaland hanger 
for defendant and his invitees. A band played at the party 
and beer and soft drinks were served. The party was held in 
the hanger part of the Dinaland structure in which the public 
is not invited and only authorized personnel are allowed. (TR 
52, lines 14-18) 
3. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on the morning of April 
17, 1988, central dispatch received an anonymous complaint 
that there was a loud party in progress in a blue building 
near the airport and that minors were present consuming 
alcohol. (TR 10, lines 19-25) 
4. Uintah County Sheriff Deputy Lytle proceeded to 
the blue building and investigated but saw no signs of a party 
at that structure. (TR 11, lines 11-15) 
5. Shortly thereafter Deputy Lytle saw individuals 
and automobiles by the Dinaland structure and proceeded to 
investigate. (TR 11, lines 16-23) 
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6. Deputy Lytle then approached the Dinaland 
structure together with Vernal City Police Officer Steve 
Hatzidakis and reserve officer Terry Shiner. (TR 40-41, lines 
20-16) 
?# While talking to individuals outside the hangei. 
Officers Shiner and Hatzidakis saw that several individuals 
were closing the hanger door. (TR 23, lines 9-17) 
8» At Officer Hatzidakis1 request, Officer Shiner ran 
towards the door ordering the individuals to leave the door 
open. (TR 40-41, lines 20-2) 
9. Officer Hatzidakis approached the hanger door and 
stated he wanted to enter the structure to check 
identification and search for minors. (TR 24, lines 14-16) 
10. After observing persons who he believed to be 
minors within the building, after having observed the general 
use of alcohol in the area, and after having noted a heavy 
odor of alcohol at the entrance to the building, Officer 
Hatzidakis announced his intention to enter the premises to 
check the area within the building for minors. Officer 
Hatzidakis informed those present of the reasons that he had 
been dispatched to the area. (Trial Court's Finding #9) 
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If. The defendant/ tfho was within the building, then 
informed Officer Hatzidakis that his father owned the Dinaland 
Aviation Building. The defendant also gave Officer Hatzidakis 
his name. The foregoing exchange between the officer and the 
defendant occurred at the .doorway or just inside the door. 
(Trial Court's Finding #10) 
12. During the exchange of information between the 
defendant and Officer Hatzidakis, the defendant inquired as to 
whether the officer possessed a warrant. When he was informed 
by the officer that the officer had no warrant, the defendant 
announced that the officer could not enter the premises. At 
about that time the defendant stepped within 8 to 10 inches of 
Officer Hatzidakis and reached his arm out to his side to a 
table in order to prevent the officer from entering. (Trial 
Court's Finding #11) 
13. The officer then shoved defendant out of the way 
and entered the premises. (Trial Court's Finding #12) The 
force of the shove knocked defendant back onto a table that 
collapsed beneath him, spilling beer and drinks on top of him. 
(Mimmick testimony, pp 55-56, lines 18-2; Baker testimony, pp 
73-74, lines 21-4; Godsey testimony, p 81, lines 8-17) 
14. The defendant after having recovered from the 
shove by Officer Hatzidakis, came forward and struck Officer 
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Hatzfidakis in the face withhis (defendant's) fis%« ,!Oie force 
of the defendant's blow and the resulting contact between the 
defendant and Officer Hatzidakis, knocked the officer outside 
where an altercation occurred between the defendant and all 
three police officers who were present* (Trial Court's Finding 
#13) 
15* During the altercation, Officer Hatzidakis 
informed the defendant that he was under arrest.^ Defendant 
heard and understood this announcement and answered that he 
was not under arrest. After having been informed of his 
arrest, the defendant vigorously resisted arrest and in the 
process against struck Officer Hatzidakis in the face with his 
(defendant's) fist. (Trial Court's Finding #14) 
16. Dinaland Aviation has at least three exits to the 
building. There were from 30 to 50 people present. 
Approximately 15 to 20 people were located within the building 
or immediately adjacent (at the doorway) to the building. The 
remaining individuals were scattered around the parking lot 
and airplane storage area which was adjacent to the building. 
(Trial Court's Finding #15) 
17. The Dinaland Aviation building is a commercial 
building which is not used as a residence. The building is 
used to accommodate parties two or three times a year. (Trial 
Court's Finding #16) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. The case was tried to the court on May 8, 1988. 
At trial, the court asked counsel to brief the issue of the 
legality of the officer's conduct. 
2. The parties submitted memoranda of law. After* 
reviewing the memoranda the court issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on August 22, 1988 finding the defendant 
guilty of assaulting a peace officer in violating of 
S76-5-102.4 and interfering with an officer in violation of 
§76-8-305. The Court held that there were exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless search and arrest of 
defendant. (Trial Court Conclusions of Law) 
3. Defendant was sentenced on September 7, 1988. 
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals on 
September 8, 1988. 
4. The parties submitted briefs to the Court of 
Appeals and the matter was set for disposition pursuant to 
Rule 31 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
5. The matter was briefed and argued to the Court on 
the issues of the legality of the warrantless search and 
arrest and the peace officerfs excessive use of force. 
6. On April 17/ 1989/ the Court issued its opinion 
wherein it agreed with appellant that the search and arrest 
were illegal but affirmed the conviction by sua sponte raising 
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and decided that there is no common law. tight, to resist an 
unlawful arrest in this jurisdiction. (See Court of Appeals 
decision attached hereto as Exhibit "A".) 
7. Appellant filed a Petition for Rehearing arguing 
that the Court's decision was in direct conflict with this 
Court's decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1975) and that the Court ignored Point II of appellant's brief 
regarding excessive use of force. 
8. The Petition for Rehearing was denied on May 8, 
1989. 
9. Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
on or about June 7, 1989. 
10. This Court granted the Petition for Certiorari on 
July 26, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that defendant 
can be convicted of assaulting a peace officer when defendant 
used force to resist a forcible warrantless entry onto his 
premises. The Court of Appeals misapplied or ignored this 
Court's decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1975), wherein this Court adopted the common law rule that the 
defendant has the right to resist an unlawful entrance onto 
his property. 
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The right Jto resist unlawful entrance la m£sm 
implicitly recognized in &.CA. §76-2-406 which grants ±& 
defendant the right to use force against another when he 
reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate criminal interference with real property. The dCourt 
of Appeals incorrectly held that defendant has no righ't to 
resist an unlawful4 invasion of his property by police 
officers, and the decision should be reversed with 
instructions to acquit defendant. 
In the event this Court wishes to review the issue of 
the legality of the' warrantless search and arrest defendant 
submits that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the 
search and arrest was illegal. 
The defendant's conviction for assault on a peace 
officer and interfering with a police officer must be reversed 
because the officer acted outside the scope of his authorities 
when he illegally entered the Dinaland Aviation hanger by 
force. The peace officers' entry into Dinaland Aviation was 
illegal because the officer entered a constitutionally 
protected area without a search warrant or consent of the 
owner. Moreover, a review of the facts demonstrates that no 
exigency existed to justify or excuse the warrantless search. 
The defendant is therefore entitled to a judgment of acquittal 
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because he struck^  the officer only after th^ toffircer forced 
hi* way^into the structure by shaving defendant oufc o£ fetis 
doorway. 
Even if the officer was justified in entering the 
structure, his excessive use of force lallowed the defendant;r im 
act i% , ^self defense, A review of the testimony indicates thst 
the officer used excessive force which entitled the defendant 
to use force to protect himself and his property. 
ARGUMENT 
POIUT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' SUA SPONTE DECISION THAT THERE 
IS NO RIGHT TO RESIST AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH OR ARREST IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. BRADSHAW, 541 
P.2d 800 (UTAH 1975). 
The Court of Appeals decided this case on an issue not 
raised or briefed by the parties, to-wit: Is the right to 
resist an unlawful arrest recognized in this jurisdiction? 
The Court apparently decided the issue as a case of first 
impression in Utah as no previous decision of this Court or 
the Court of Appeals was cited as authority for the 
proposition anywhere in the opinion* See Exhibit "A". The 
opinion is in conflict with this Court's decision in State v, 
Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). 
In Bradshaw, this Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a statute that made it illegal to interfere 
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with a law enf6rcerae»t d£#i&i*l regardless of Whether there is 
a legal basts fot trfte artest* As the ©@&ctLstatedr 
The language of the particular statute we are 
here dealing with is undoubtedly subject to the 
constitutional challenge of vagueness.. That 
part of the statute "regardless of whether there 
is a * legal badis for the arrest* may be subject 
to various meanings and interpretations. , If -the 
intention of the legislature was to penalize a 
law-abiding citizen by incarceration because he 
did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest, 
a statute authorizing the same is in violation 
of both the Utah, and United States 
Constitutions/ as above referred to in that it 
permits and authorizes an arrest without 
probable cause and without i lawful -basis *%£or .the 
arrest. 
Id. at 801. (.Emphasis added) 
The language that most bothered this Coiirt in Bradshaw 
was "regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the 
arrest." Yet, the construction given the current S76-5-102.4 
and §76-8-305 by the Court of Appeals implicitly amends that 
very language back into the statute. Moreover, the anomoly of 
convicting an individual for assaulting an officer and 
interfering with an officer who illegally entered a building 
after being denied admission for not having a warrant and who 
then proceeded to„ shove his way through the doorway is best 
described in Justice Henroid's concurring opinion: 
It seems to me to be somewhat of a departure 
from reality and practicality and even morality 
to say a statute is constitutional that says one 
person can violate the law and by virtue of such 
illegal act induce another to indulge in a 
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confrontation which he 'd£d,4il<$t seek andngetwsix 
months because a possible tormenter, acting 
illegally, goaded him into it* It is a rather 
superficial answer to say, as do the dissenters 
here, that having perhaps unwittingly 
"interfered" in an arrest, with the sometimes 
ludicrous and chameleonic meaning that someone 
"might" attach to the word, the "interferer," 
acting in good faith, not having read this funny 
statute, ^ should be content to lose his job> his 
good name in the community, his liberty for ^ix 
months, and his respect for the establishment, 
in^ exchange ^for J:he great privilege of Jairing a 
lawyer going to court to seek damages (which are 
no substitute for lpgis_jof freedom), -all because 
one of the countless hordes of law ^nfojrc^ment 
officials not only committed a pedlculotfs;! but 
illegal rip-off in making what is worse, the 
arrest of a person who at common law had a 
perfect right to resist, and who, but for this 
paternalistic, autocratic legislation in a free 
society, could resist arrest, and who as of now, 
can resist arrest if it happens to be classified 
as a citizen's arrest. 
Id. at 804. (Emphasis added) 
This Court has adopted the common law rule that one is 
entitled to resist an illegal arrest or search. Indeed the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is remarkably 
similar to the dissenting opinion in Bradshaw filed by Justice 
Crockett, Id. 541 P.2d at 806-807. The opinion of the Court 
of Appeals therefore is in conflict with a previous decision 
of the Utah Supreme Court and should be reversed. 
Moreover, U.C.A. S76-2-406 provides a separate 
justification for defendants.adtions thereby etfdi»in§ 
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defendant from any criminal TJfMXfnduct. U.C.A. S76-2-406 
provides: 
A person is justified i^n Using force, other 
than deadly force, against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that 
force is necessary to prevent or terminate 
criminal interference with real property or 
personal property: 
(1) lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) lawfully in the possession of a member 
of his immediately family; or 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he 
has a legal duty to protect. 
In this case, it is undisputed that defendant was 
lawfully in possession of the premises and believed the 
officers forced entry to be illegal. The sole question is 
whether the officers illegal entry constitutes criminal 
interference with real property. 18 U.S.C. S242 makes it a 
federal crime to deprive any inhabitant of any state of any 
rights protected by the United States Constitution while 
acting under color of state laws. See 18 U.S.C. §242. Thus 
if the officer entered the premises in violation of 
defendant's rights under the United States Constitution and 
was acting under color of state law, he was engaged in 
criminal interference with defendant's rights and defendant 
was entitled to use reasonable force to resist the unlawful 
entrance. Defendant is therefore entitled to a judgment of 
acquittal based upon the illegal entrance of the officer onto 
his property. 
R0INT JH 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE OFFICER 
ACTED ILLEGALLY WHEN HE FORCIBLY ENTERED DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS 
IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I S14 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.. 
D*C.A. §76-5-102*4 provides: 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with 
knowledge that he is a peace officer, and when 
the peace officer is acting within the scope of 
his authority as a peace officer is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
At issue in this case is whether the officers had any 
legal basis to force his way into the Dinaland Aviation 
hanger. In the event this Court chooses to review this 
portion of the Court of Appeals decision, the following review 
of the case law will show that the Court of Appeals correctly 
held that they did not have a legal basis to force their way 
into defendant's property. 
A. The Dinaland Aviation hanger is an area protected 
against unreasonable search and seizures. 
The United States and Utah Supreme Courts have 
repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment to the United STates 
Constitution protects businesses, commercial and industrial 
structures, as well as homes, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, U.S. , 
90 L.Ed.2d 226, 235 (1986); Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 
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0*&. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816r 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 311 (1978); State V, 
Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 324-35, 445 P.2d 691 (19([&)v 
Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., supra, involved an OSHA 
inspector's right to enter business premises without a warrant 
over the owner's objection. In rejecting the government's, 
argument that a warrant is not necessary, the Court stated: 
The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment 
protects commercial buildings as well as 
private homes. To hold otherwise would 
believe the origin of that Amendment, and the 
American Colonial experience (with general 
search warrants). . . . Against this 
background it is untenable that the ban on 
warrantless searches was not intended to 
shield places of business as well as of 
residence. 
This court has already held that warrantless 
searches are generally unreasonable, and that 
this rule applies to commercial premises as 
well as homes. (Citing Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 87 S.Ct. 
1727 (1967).) (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that searches of 
business establishments are illegal without a warrant absent 
exigent circumstances. State v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 
318, 325, 445 P.2d 691 (1968). 
In this case Dinaland Aviation hanger is entitled to 
the same protections granted other commercial structures. It 
is a privately leased structure not open to the general 
public. (TR 52, lines 14-18). The Gardiners quite clearly* 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy for themselves and 
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t he i r invi ted guests and are therefc^e e n t i t l e d f& 4I*€ 
cons t i t u t i ona l pro tec t ions provided in the Fwirdth .Aiffl&fcdiBeiiti 
and Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution, 
B. NO exigent circumstances existed to justify the 
warrantless search in this case* 
There is no dispute that the entty into Dttt&land 
Aviation by the peace officer was conducted without a 
warrant. It is now well established that "searches conducted 
without a warrant are per se under the Fourth Amendment -
subject only to a few specifically deliniated exceptions." 
.State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Katz 
v_> United States, 389 U.S. 346, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 
L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967) (Emphasis in original) 
As the United States Supreme Court stated:. 
Warrantless felony arrests in the home are 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment absent 
probable cause and exigent circumstances 
And that the police bear a heavy burden 
when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need 
that might justify warrantless searches or 
arrests. 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 790, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 
732, 734 (1984) 
Moreover, the burden of proving the existence of 
exigent circumstances is especially difficult to prove when 
the warrantless arrest involved a relatively minor crime. Id. 
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Exigent circumstances often has b6en defined in terfluaf 
of emergency circumstances• see united states v> Aguino, 836 
F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1988) or that the exigencies of the 
situation made the search imperative. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455f 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 
564 (1971) (plurality opium); State v. Ashe, supra, 745 P.2d 
at 1258. The only case in which the United States Supreme 
Court has authorized warrantless entry into a suspects home, 
other than consent and searches incident to arrest, have 
involved hot pursuit of a fleeing felon when the police could 
have arrested without a warrant. United States v. Santana, 
427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 2409, 49 L.Ed. 300, 305 
(1976). In a hot pursuit case, warrantless entry is in part 
justified by the significant risk that the [evidence] would no 
longer be in the suspects possession if the police waited 
until a warrant could be obtained. United States v. Aquino, 
836 F.2d at 1268 quoting United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. at 
44, 96 S.Ct. at 2410, 49 L.Ed.2d at 306. In State v. Ashe, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that exigent circumstances existed 
because the suspect had seen the officers arrive and approach 
the residence and could have easily disposed of the suspected 
contraband. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1259. 
The United States Supreme Court case that most closely 
parallels the facts of this case is Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
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supra. The defendant in Welsh was suspected of committing the 
offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, a non 
jailable traffic offense under Wisconsin law. The suspect had 
been seen driving in an erratic manner and drove his car off 
the road. The operator of the vehicle then got out and walked 
home. Upon arriving at the scene of the accident* police 
officers were told that the driver was either very sick or 
very intoxicated. The police checked the registration and 
found that it was registered to Edward Welsh. Police then 
drove to the Welsh residence and without obtaining a warrant 
gained entrance to the premises. Proceeding upstairs, the 
police found Welsh asleep in bed and placed him under arrest 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Finding that circumstance did not support warrantless 
entry and arrest in the home, the Court stated: 
Our hesitation in finding exigent 
circumstances, particularly when warrantless 
arrests in the home are at issue, is 
especially appropriate when the underlying 
offense for which there is probable cause to 
arrest is relatively minor. Before agents of 
the government may invade the sanctity of the 
home, the burden is on the government to 
demonstrate exigent circumstances that 
overcome the presumption of unreasonableness 
that attaches to all warrantless home 
entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 
586, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 100 S.Ct. 1371. When the 
government's interest is only to arrest for a 
minor offense, that presumption of 
unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and 
the government usually should be allowed to 
make such arrests only with a warrant issued 
upon probable cause by a neutral and detached 
magistrate. 
Id. at 80 L.Ed. 743 
The $t&€e of^Wisconsin detempted m Jflsfciff the arrest 
by relying on the need to preserve evidence of the petiti6n<&£0 
blood alcohol content and other exigent circumstances. Id. 
466 U.S. at 753, 80 L.Ed.2d at 745. The Court soundly 
rejected these arguments: 
The State attempts to justify tfie arre&t by 
relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the 
threat to public safety, and on the need to 
preserve evidence of the petitioner's 
blood-alcohol level. On the facts of this 
case, however, the claim of hot pursuit is 
unconvincing because there was no immediate or 
continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the 
scene of a crime. Moreover, because the 
petitioner had already arrived home, and had 
abandoned his care at the scene of the 
accident, there was little remaining threat to 
the public safety. Hence,the only potential 
emergency claimed by the State was the need to 
ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. 
Even assuming, however, that the underlying 
facts would support a finding of this exigent 
circumstance, mere similarity to other cases 
involving the imminent destruction of evidence 
is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has 
chosen to classify the first offense for 
driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, 
civil forfeiture offense for which no 
imprisonment is possible. See Wis State 
346.65 (2) (1975); 346.65 (2)(a)(Supp 
1983-1984); supra, at 746, 80 L.Ed.2d, at 
States interest in presipitating an arrest, 
and is— one that can be easily identified both 
by the courts and by officers faced with a 
decision to arrest. See* n 6, supra. Given 
warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld 
simply because evidence of the petitioner's 
blood-alcohol level might have dissipated 
while the police obtained a warrant. To allow 
a warrantless home entry on these facts would 
be to approve unreasonable police behavior 
that the principles of the Fourth Amendment 
will not sanction. 
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The factscof |hifki$§p€NClosely parallel fefaoge found in 
Welshf First the State was investigating a relatively minoi 
crime- underaged consumption of alcohol. Second, the State 
attempted to create an exigency for its warrantless entry by 
arguing that alcohol was easily disposable. This argument 
clearly ignores the fact that there are ptjier, items of 
evidence available to confirm consumption of alcoholf such as 
balance tests, the smell of alcohol on a suspegt*s breath or 
person, horizontal gaze nystagmus test and any other tests 
used by law enforcement to detect the consumption of alcohol. 
Evidence of a person's age is also unlikely to 
disappear while the officers obtained a warrant* The facts 
indicated that Dinaland Aviatiop has three exits. The 
officers could have stationed themselves outside each exit 
while the other officer sought authorization for a search 
warrant to enter the premises. The lack of a true exigent 
circumstance renders the entrance illegal and the State 
therefore cannot prove that the officer was acting within the 
scope of his authority when he was struck after illegally 
forcing his way into the Dinaland structure by knocking the 
defendant out of the doorway. 
Defendant is therefore entitled to a .judgment of 
acquittal $s a matter of law. 
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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO USE FORCE TO RESIST THE 
POLICE OFFICER'S UNLAWFUL ENTRY INTO THE BUILDING AND ALSO IN 
RESPONSE TO THE OFFICER'S UNNECESSARY USE OF FORCE. 
A separate reason justifying defendant's acquittal is 
that the officer used excessive force under the 
circumstances* U*C«A. 76^5-102*4 provided: 
Any person who assaults a peace office*, with* 
knowledge that he is a peace officer, and when 
the peace officer is acting within the scope 
of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
The key phrase here is when the peace officer "acting 
within the scope of his authority as a pease officer". If the 
police officer used excessive force, then officer acted 
outside the scope of his authority and defendant is entitled 
to use force reasonably necessary to defend himself. Numerous 
courts have found that use of excessive force by a police 
officer excuses resistance and assault upon the officer by a 
citizen. Brown v. Anchorage, 680 p.2d 100 (Alaska App. 
1984); Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983) 
(unnecessary use of force by police officer during search can 
excuse assault of peace officer); People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 
9 (Colo. 1984) (excessive use of force by a peace officer 
justifies physical resistance by citizen); State v. Castle, 
616 P.2d 510 (Or. App. 1980). 
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Moreover* U*€»A. S7G-2-402 allows defendant to use 
force "against fnother when and to the extent that he 
reasonable believes that such force is necessary to defend 
himself or a third person against such others imminent use of 
unlawful force ^ , . * 
In this case, in addition to unlawful etitry, th# facts 
show that Officer Hatzidakis used, unnecessary and excessive 
force to gain entry into the structure after being told that 
he could not enter without a warrant* Witnesses testified 
that the police officer shoved the defendant so hard that he 
fell backward over a table. The facts clearly indicate that 
until defendant was knocked over a table, the defendant had 
made no verbal or physical threats against Officer 
Hatzidakis. Officer Hatzidakis knocked defendant over a table 
when defendant denied him admission to the hanger without any 
verbal warning to move out of the way or otherwise back off. 
(see trial transcript pages 73**74* lines 21^4; Godsey 
testimony, pages 81, lines 8-17). It was only after he had 
been knocked over a table by the officer that he grabbed the 
officer and wrestled him to the ground. The defendant 
therefore was the victim of unlawful aggression and excessive 
force and acted in self defense as allowed In 0*Ci&# 
S76-2-402. Thus, the defendant should be acquitted &f the 
charges of assault and interfering with a police officer 
-22-
because the officer used excessive force under the 
circumstances and defendant only acted in self defense, 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons the defendant/appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment of 
the Utah Court of Appeals with instruction to acquit defendant 
as a matter of law. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 1989. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
HARRY/H. SOUVALIh 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on this 13th day of 
November, 1989. 
Harry W. Souvall 
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ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 880557-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-OO0OO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Chad Arthur Gardiner, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Orme (On Rule 31 hearing). 
Defendant appeals his conviction of assault on a police 
officer, arising out of defendant physically resisting the 
officer's attempt to search certain business premises owned by 
defendant's father. Defendant argues that he was justified in 
striking the officer because the attempted warrantless search 
was unlawful. 
We agree with defendant that there were no exigent 
circumstances that permitted the police officer to legally 
conduct a warrantless search of the premises for alcohol being 
served to minors. But, even though that is the issue that has 
been raised and argued by both parties, it is not the relevant 
issue in this case. The legality or illegality of the search 
cannot justify defendant's conduct nor excuse his offense. 
e<hibrt "A" 
Defendant had no right to resist a peaceful search, 
regardless of whether that search might ultimately be 
determined legal or illegal, unless defendant can show that the 
officer was not reasonably identified as a police officer, was 
not acting pursuant to his authority, or had used excessive 
force. Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Alaska 1983). 
Accord U.S. v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 390 (3rd Cir. 1971), 
cert, denied 402 U.S. 1008 (1971); State v. Doe. 92 N.M. 100, 
583 P.2d 464, 466-7 (1978). The trial court found that the 
officer acted in performance of his official duties. Defendant 
does not challenge the courtfs specific finding that the 
officer reasonably acted to preserve his own safety when he 
pushed defendant away and that the force used was not excessive. 
We reject defendant's argument that he is entitled to 
resist a search which he deems to be illegal. Any traditional 
common law sanction for such conduct is anachronistic and no 
longer justifiable. See People v. Hess. 687 P.2d 443 (Colo 
1984). When society has provided other adequate legal means to 
obtain an impartial review and resolution of legal disputes, 
the necessity for a self-help remedy, such as physically 
resisting an officer who is performing his duty, is radically 
dissipated. Our society need no longer tolerate such efforts. 
Ellison v. State. 410 P.2d 519, 525 (Del. Super. 1979). The 
resistance to a questionable search or arrest can lead to 
violence and injury, as in this case. Self-help may well 
invite graver consequences to the accused and the officer than 
any injury occasioned by the search or arrest itself. State v. 
fio_e, 583 P.2d at 467; State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 568 P.2d 
1040, 1045-46 (1977). 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed, 
DATED this / Y day of April, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of April, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE was mailed to 
each of the parties named below by depositing the same in the United 
States mail. 
Harry H. Souvall (Argued) 
McRae & DeLand 
Attorneys at Law 
2Q9 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Alvin G. Nash (Argued) 
Attorneys at Law 
Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Vernal Circuit Court 
#305 Uintah County Building 
147 East Main 
Vernal, UT 84078 
#881000203 and #8801000204 
DATED this 17th day of April, 1989. 
y^.vcvr^V: 
£as~e Manager 
18 USCS § 241, n 71 CRIMES 
ccution under 18 USCS §241 for casting ficti-
tious votes in primary election is limited to 
conspiracies to cast false-votes for candidates for 
federal offices, failure of jury instructions, to 
which no objection was made at trial or before 
Court of Appeals, to focus on federal offices, 
does not constitute plain error where there was 
single conspiracy to cast entire slates of fake 
votes, and where defense consisted in large part 
of challenge to credibility of government's wit-
nesses so that case ultimately hinged on whether 
jury would believe or disbelieve their testimony. 
Anderson v United States (1974) 417 US 211, 41 
L Ed 2d 20, 94 S Ct 2253. 
Dismissal with prejudice at pretrial hearing of 
indictment against one charged with conspiracy 
in violation of 18 USCS § 241, who moved to 
dismiss indictment on ground that under grants 
of immunity from state he had provided testi-
mony which discussed his involvement in con-
spiracy, which testimony came into hands of 
government, was appealable by United States 
under 18 USCS §3731. United States v De 
Diego (1975) 167 App DC 252, 511 F2d 818. 
tions applied to such action for damages. 0*Sulli-
van v Felix (1914) 233 US 318, 58 L Ed 980, 34 
SCt 596. 
18 USCS §241 provides no basis for civil 
liability. Agnew v Compton (1956, CA9 Cal) 239 
F2d 226, cert den 353 US 959, 1 L Ed 2d 910, 
77 S Ct 868 and (ovrld on other grounds Cohen 
v Norris (CA9 Cal) 300 F2d 24). 
18 USCS § 241 does not provide civil cause of 
action for damages. Watson v Devlin (1958, DC 
Mich) 167 F Supp 638, affd (CA6 Mich) 268 
F2d 211; Bryant v Donnell (1965, DC Tenn) 239 
F Supp 681. 
18 USCS § 241 provides criminal sanctions for 
violations of civil rights laws but it creates no 
civil liability. Means v Wilson (1974, DC SD) 
383 F Supp 378, affd in part and revd in part on 
other grounds (CA8 SD) 522 F2d 833, cert den 
424 US 958, 47 L Ed 2d 364, 96 S Ct 1436. 
18 USCS §§ 241 and 242 provide no standing 
for civil suit. Weiland v Byrne (1975, DC 111) 
392 F Supp 21. 
72. Appeal and review 
Even assummg arguendo that conspiracy pros-
§ 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, 
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, 
pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by 
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of 
citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 
one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for 
any term of years or for life. 
(June 25, 1948, ch 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 696; Apr. 11, 1968, P.L. 90-284, Title 
I, § 103(b), 82 Stat. 75.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Prior Uw and revision: 
This section is based on Act Mar. 4, 1909, ch 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1092 
(former 18 U.S.C. § 52). 
Reference to persons causing or procuring was omitted as unnecessary 
in view of definition of "principal" in 18 USCS § 2. 
A minor change was made in phraseology. 
Amendments: 
1968. Act Apr. 11, 1968, inserted "; and if death results shall be 
subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life". 
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sudden combat was sot whether combat Lawful act by lawful means, 
arose with suddenness, but whether com- Defendant, in fatally striking another 
bat, together with all facts and eircum- patron while leaving eafe immediately 
stances that immediately preceded and
 after having slapped his wife during ax-
those that surrounded it, provoked, en- gument, was not doing "lawful aet by 
raged, annoyed and confused reasonable lawful means1'; instruction on excusable 
man to such degree that he might have homicide was not required. State v. John-
been excused from results of his acts. State
 8oa, 112 TJ. 130, 185 P. 2d 738. 
v. Johnson, 112 U. 130,185 P. 2d 738. 
Provocation. 
, , . . . . Provocation must have been created by 
Instruction on former excusable homicide
 d e c e a g e d a n d n o t b t M r d p e r g o n f o r b o m . 
statute could not be given unless evidence
 i d d e tQ b e e x c u / a b l a g h a v i b e e n justified it. State v. Dewey, 41 U. 538,
 c o m m i t t e d b y a c c i d e i l t and misfortune in 
127 P. 275; State v. Johnson, 112 U. 130,
 h e a t o f ? a s 8 i o n u p o n 8 u d d e n a n d 8 u f f i c i e n t 
185 P. 2d 738. provocation, and deceased must have been 
In prosecution tor homicide, evidence reasonably responsible for exciting de-
was sufficient to show that defendant was fendant's passions. State v. Johnson, 112 
entitled to full instructions on self-defense, U. 130,185 P. 2d 738. 
right of defendant to stand his ground, 
defense of relative or member of family Shooting burglar. 
and defense of habitation. State v. Harris, Qne cbarged with shooting twelve-year-
58 U. 331, 199 P. 145.
 0ld boy who was attempting to burglarize 
T
 w *«*<*« defendant's rabbit pens could invoke for* 
jury question*
 m e r j u s t i f i a b l e homicide statute. State v. 
The matter of self-defense in deter- Terrell, 55 U. 314, 186 P. 108, 25 A. L. R. 
mining whether homicide was justifiable 407. 
was question for jury. State v. Law, 106 
U. 196, 147 P. 2d 324. 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person—Forcible felony defined.—(1) A 
person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and 
to the extent that he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of 
unlawful force; however, a person is justified in using force which is 
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he 
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or a third person, or to prevent the commission 
of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances 
specified in paragraph (1) of this section if he: 
(a) Initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent 
to use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or 
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commis-
sion or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, un-
less he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such 
other person his intent to do so and the other notwithstanding continues 
or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force. 
(3) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated 
assault, mayhem, murder in the first and second degree and manslaughter, 
kidnaping, and aggravated kidnaping, rape, forcible sodomy, and ag-
gravated sexual assault, as they are defined in chapter 5 of this code, and 
also includes arson, robbery, and burglary, as defined in chapter 6 of this 
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code. Any other felony offense which involves the use of force or violence 
against a person so as to create a substantial danger of death or serious 
bodily injury also constitutes a forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, as 
defined in section 76-6-204, shall not constitute a forcible felony except 
where the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful entry is made or at-
tempted. 
History: a 1953, 76-240% enacted by 
I* 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-402; L. 1974, ch. 32, 
§6. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1974 amendment added subsec. (3). 
Self-defense. 
While defendant is entitled to an acquit-
tal if the evidence raises a reasonable 
doubt whether he acted in self-defense, no 
such doubt existed in manslaughter case 
where defendant, after seeing his father 
accosted by two men who then let the 
father go, called the men back to the car 
he was driving, scuffled with one, then 
shot him twice. State in interest of Gon-
zales, 545 P. 2d 187. 
Collateral References. 
Assault and Battery<§=>67, 68; Homicide 
<§=n09. 
6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery §§ 87-93; 
40 C.J.S. Homicide § 114. 
6 Am. Jur. 2d 58, 63-73, Assault and 
Battery §§63, 69-80; 40 Am. Jur. 2d 429, 
Homicide § 139. 
Evidence of habit or character. 
Where defendant introduced issue of 
self-defense based on theory that intoxi-
cation may have partly caused deceased 
to have become temporarily insane and 
aggressor in attempted assault, possibility 
or probability of defendants story could 
be rebutted by testimony of abstemious 
habits or character of deceased. State v. 
Mares, 113 U. 225, 192 P. 2d 861. 
Evidence of probable aggressor. 
In prosecution of striker for murder of 
acting fireman on train carrying strike-
breakers and armed guards to mine, in 
which striker defended on ground of self-
defense, evidence that month prior to kill-
ing, band of strikers with drawn guns 
searched train for suspected strikebreakers 
was admissible as tending to show which 
party was probable aggressor. State v. 
Pagialakis, 65 U. 552, 238 P. 256. 
Forcible ejection. 
Conviction of murder in first degree for 
homicide growing out of forcible ejection 
Admissibility of evidence as to other's 
character or reputation for turbulence on 
question of self-defense by one charged 
with assault or homicide, 1 A. L. B. 3d 571. 
Admissibility of evidence of uncommuni-
cated threats on issue of self-defense in 
prosecution for homicide, 98 A. L. B. 2d 6. 
Duty of trial court to instruct on self-
defense, in absence of request by accused, 
56 A. L. B. 2d 1170. 
Homicide: duty to retreat as condition 
of self-defense when one is attacked at his 
office, or place of business or employment, 
41 A. L. B. 3d 584. 
Homicide: duty to retreat where assail-
ant and assailed share the same living 
quarters, 26 A. L. B. 3d 1296. 
Homicide: extent of premises which may 
be defended without retreat under right 
of self-defense, 52 A. L. B. 2d 1458. 
Homicide: modem status of rules as to 
burden and quantum of proof to show self-
defense, 43 A. L. B. 3d 221. 
Belationship with assailant's wife as 
provocation depriving defendant of right 
of self-defense, 9 A. L. B. 3d 9/33. 
of defendant from beer parlor by deceased 
peace officer who was not in uniform was 
sustained although defendant claimed self-
defense. State v. BeBee, 113 U. 398, 195 
P. 2d 746. 
Homicide justified. 
Under common law, there must have 
been actual necessity for homicide, but 
under statutes and decisions of courts of 
several states, homicide is justifiable if 
there exists in mind of slayer reasonable 
belief that necessity exists. State v. Ter-
rell, 55 TJ. 314, 186 P. 108, 25 A. L. B. 497, 
Slayer need only have acted upon ap-
pearances and it was sufficient if he acted 
in good faith and had reasonable grounds 
to believe, and did believe, that under 
circumstances his legal rights were being 
feloniously invaded and necessity existed 
for force used by him in prevention of 
crime. State v. Terrell, 55 U. 314, 186 P. 
108, 25 A. L. B. 497. 
Instructions. 
If court gave correct statement of law 
of self-defense, it was not reversible error 
DECISIONS TJNDEB FOBMEB LAW 
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(4) The force is necessary to prevent an escape from a penal institu-
tion or other place of confinement and the officer reasonably believes the 
person to be lawfully detained* 
History: 0. 1953, 76-2-404, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1078, ck 196, § 76-2404. Homicide<S»l03. 
n™« !******«<*•« 4 0 C J S « Homicide § 100. 
Cross-Beferences. ^
 A m J u r 2 d 4 2 4 * H o m i c i d e § l t L 
Authority of peace officer to stop, ques- _ „ 
tion, search and take possession of weap- Peace officers, criminal responsibility 
ons, narcotics or stolen property, 77-13-33
 0fy for killing or wounding one whom 
to 77-13-35. they wished to investigate or identify, 
Pursuit and rearrest, 77-14-1. 18 A. L. E. 1368, 61 A. L, B. 321. 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation.—A person is justified in using 
force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful 
entry into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is justified in the use 
of force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury 
only if: 
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous man-
ner and he reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the 
purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person, dwelling 
or being therein and that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence; or 
(2) He reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for 
the purpose of committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary 
to prevent the commission of the felony. 
History: O. 1953, 76-2-406, enacted by his castle," from which he may exclude 
L. 1973, CIL 19S, § 76-2-405. intruders by use of reasonable force, and 
its aim is to preserve the peace and good 
Scope of defense.
 o r ( j e r 0f s o c iety; therefore, it is to be 
Defendant in murder prosecution, who broadly construed, and applies not only to 
killed decedent after the latter refused to acts in defense of a person's actual resi-
leave defendant's sister's house, was en- dence, but any place he may be peacefully 
titled to raise this section as a defense, occupying as a home or habitation, includ-
notwithstanding the fact that the sister's ing a hotel or motel room, or the home of 
house was not defendant's own; the rule of another in which he is a guest. State v. 
this section is a codification of the com- Mitcheson, 560 P. 2d 1120. 
mon-law principle that "a man's home is 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMEB LAW 
Extent of right.
 u p o n reasonable grounds of belief that 
Homieide or assault with deadly weapon invasion of some right accorded by statute 
could not be justified unless in necessary was being made by offender, and then only 
defense of habitation, property or person, such force could be employed as reasonably 
and if necessity failed, thi right to invoke required to successfully repel the invader, 
the statute failed; the necessity need not State v. Terrell, 55 U. 314, 186 P. 108, 25 
have been real but only reasonably appar- A. L. R. 497. 
ent; resistance had to be in good faith 
76-2-408. Force in defense of property.—A person is justified in using 
force, other than deadly force, against another when and to the extent that 
he reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent or terminate 
criminal interference with real property or personal property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
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or 
Lawfully in the possession of & member of his immediate family; 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to pro-
tect 
History: a 1953, 75-2-406, enacted by 
L. 1973, clL 196, $ 76-2-40* 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Children. 
A person over the age of fourteen was 
capable of committing a crime, the pre-
sumption of incapacity applying only to 
those between the ages of seven and four-
teen years; child of twelve years of age 
could violate law and commit offense 
against person or property the same as an 
adult person if child knew of wrongfulness 
of the act. State v. Terrell, 55 U. 314, 186 
P. 108, 25 A. L. R. 497; Sadleir v. Young, 
97 U. 291, 85 P. 2d 810; Chatwin v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 455, 90 L. Ed. 198, 66 
S. Ct. 233. 
Child of twelve years of age could vio-
late law and commit offense against person 
or property the same as an adult person If 
he knew of wrongfulness of his act, and 
defense of justification was available to 
defendant who shot boy attempting to bur-
glarize his rabbit pens; question of neces-
sity of defendant's having used means em-
ployed to protect property was for jury 
determination. 8tate v. Terrell, 55 U. 314, 
186 P. 108, 25 A. L. R. 497. 
CHAPTER 3 
PUNISHMENTS 
Part 1. Classification of Offenses 
8ection 
76-3*101. Sentencing in accordance with chapter. 
76-3-102. Designation of offenses. 
76-3-103. Felonies classified. 
76-3-104. Misdemeanors classified. 
76-3-105. Infractions. 
Part & Sentencing 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil penalties. 
76-3-202. Paroled persons—Termination or discharge from sentence—Time served on 
parole—Discretion of board of pardons. 
76-3-203. Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment—Increase of sen-
tence if firearm used. 
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction—Term of imprisonment 
76-3-205. Infraction conviction—Fine, forfeiture, and disqualification. 
76-3-206. Capital felony—Death or life imprisonment. 
76-3-207. Capital felony—Hearing on sentence. 
76-3-208. Imprisonment—Custodial authorities. 
Part 3. Fines and Special Sanctions 
76-3-301. Fines of persons. 
76-3-302. Fines of corporations, associations, partnerships, or governmental instru-
mentalities* 
76-3-303. Additional sanctions against corporation or association—Advertising of con-
viction—Disqualification of officer. 
Part 4. Limitations and Special Provisions on Sentences 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations. 
76-3-402. Conviction of loweT category of offense. 
76-3-403. Credit for good behavior against sentence for misdemeanor. 
76-3-404. Pre-sentence investigation—Commitment of defendant—Sentencing procedure. 
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence set aside. 
48 
76-5-102.4 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-5*102.4. Assault against peace officer. 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority 
as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
History: C. 1953,76-5-102.4, enacted by L. peace officer is acting within the scope of his 
1974, ch. 32, i 32; 1987, ch. 23, § L authority as a peace officer" for "on duty.* 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1987 amendment Cross-References. — Assault on conserva-
substituted Ma peace officer, and when the tion officer, § 23-20-2& 
76-5-102,5. Assault by prisoner. 
Evidence of assault 
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, 
the videotape of all bookings, including the de-
fendant's, was erased and recycled after 72 
hours if there was no request to retain it, and 
the defendant sought dismissal of the charge 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 
1989, ch. 170, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1989 amendment, 
effective April 24, 1989, substituted "danger-
ous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601" for 
"deadly weapon" in Subsection (l)(b) and made 
stylistic changes throughout the section. 
ANALYSIS 
Defense of habitation. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficient. 
Instructions. 
—Flight. 
Lesser included offense. 
Object of threat. 
—Victim. 
Recklessness. 
Self defense. 
Serious bodily injury. 
Threatening with dangerous weapon distin-
guished. 
Voluntary intoxication. 
Cited. 
Defense of habitation. 
Defendant's appearances at his estranged 
that she, while in custody, had assaulted a po-
lice officer, because there was no showing that 
loss of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the 
issue of the defendant's guilt, the trial court 
erred in dismissing the assault charge. State v. 
Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him 
no proprietary right or justification to consider 
or treat the apartment as his own "habitation," 
and his aggravated assault on his wife's over-
night male companion was therefore not justi-
fied by § 76-2-405. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 
984 (Utah 1986). 
Evidence. 
In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the 
trial court's admission of a knife, similar to the 
one used in the assault, and a ruler, illustra-
tive of the testimony of a witness and indica-
tive of the actual length of the weapon, was not 
unduly prejudicial. State v, Royball, 710 P.2d 
168 (Utah 1985). 
—Sufficient 
The defendant's conduct in pulling a loaded 
.38 caliber revolver from his waistband and 
shooting one of his victims in the upper leg, 
followed by threats to both victims, was suffi-
cient evidence to support a conviction under 
Subsection (1Kb). State v. Haro, 703 P.2d 301 
(Utah 1985). 
Where the defendant testified at trial that he 
was angered by his wife's comments, so he 
struck her, and he did not contradict her testij 
mony, or that of the doctor, which described 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
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PART 3 
OBSTRUCTING GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
Section Section 
76-8-305. Interference with peace officer 76-8-314. Threatening elected officials — 
making lawful arrest "Elected official" defined. 
76-8-306. Obstructing justice. 76-8-315. Threatening elected officials — 
76-8-313. Threatening elected officials — Penalties for assault 
Commission of assault 
76-8-301. Interference with public servant 
Constitutionality. 
This section is not unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982). 
76-8-305, Interference with peace officer making lawful 
arrest 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself or another and inter-
feres with such arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-305, enacted by L. § 76-8-305), relating to interference with law 
1981, ch. 62, | 1. enforcement official seeking to detain 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1981, ch. 62, § 1 interferor or another, and enacted new 
repealed old § 76-8-305 (L 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-305. 
76-8-306. Obstructing justice. 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder, prevent, or 
delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of 
another for the commission of a crime, he: 
(a) knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it from a magis-
trate; 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender; 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other 
means for avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery or apprehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence that might aid in 
the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the person; 
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from perform-
ing an act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, or 
conviction of the person; or 
(g) having knowledge that a law enforcement officer has been autho-
rized or has applied for authorization under either Section 77-23a-10 or 
77-23a-15 to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication, gives 
notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any person. 
(2) An offense under Subsection (l)(a) through (f) is a class B misdemeanor, 
unless the actor knows that the offender committed a capital offense or a 
felony of the first degree, in which case it is a second degree felony. 
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78-2-1. Number of justices — Term — Chief justice and 
associate chief justice —- Selection and functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed initially to serve until 
the first general election held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme 
Court is ten years and commences on the first Monday in January, next 
following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief justice from among 
the members of the court by a majority vote of all justices. The term of the 
office of chief justice is four years. The chief justice may not serve successive 
terms. The chief justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court The chief justice may be removed from the 
office of chief justice by a majority vote of all justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a 
vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until 
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is 
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as 
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme 
Court, the chief justice has additional duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of 
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall 
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent 
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice, where not inconsistent with law, may delegate re-
sponsibilities to the associate chief justice. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, I 1; C. 1*43, Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of tlw 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1909, ch. 247,1 1; 1986, ch. Supreme Court is ten years and until his suc-
47, i 40; 1988, ch. 248, f 4. ceasor is appointed and approved in accordance 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- with Section 20-1-7 1" and, in Subsection (6), 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection substituted "determines" for "decides" at the 
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read end of the fourth sentence 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
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(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct CorjajiiiBJui^  
(e) final orders and decrees in, formal actf ^ dicative proceedings origin 
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal ac(j 
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under t 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first < 
gree or capital felony; and 
(}) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which t 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of t 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdicti* 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order o 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water abjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petit 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals abjudication, but 1 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appe 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 4 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted for-
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in 
Subsection (3Xe); added Subsection (3X0; re-
designated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3Xi) ac-
cordingly; substituted tt(i)M for "(h)" at the end 
of Subsection (4)(g); and made minor styl 
changes. 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 
1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of! 
section (3XeXiii); rewrote Subsection 0 
which read "first degree and capital felony 
victions"; substituted "(f)" for "(i)" at the ei 
Subsection (4Xg); and made minor styl 
changes. 
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CONSTITUTION OP TOS UNITED STATES AMEND. XIV, § 5 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 1 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 8. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
XI 
CONSTITUTION OP UTAH A*T. I, § 14 
Sec. 14, [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 7. 
Cross-References. 
Controlled Substances Act, search war-
rants, 58-37-10. 
Liquor, search, seizure and confiscation, 
32-8-16 et aeq. 
Statutory provisions generally, 77-54-1 
et seq. 
In general. 
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum 
nor under a motion to examine will an 
examination be permitted of a nature to 
contravene provision against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Evans v. Evans, 98 
U. 189, 98 P. 2d 703. 
I t is generally recognized that the legiti-
mate use of a search warrant is restricted 
to public prosecutions, and in no event 
may such proceeding be invoked for the 
protection of a mere private right. Allen 
v. Trueman, Judge, 100 U. 36, 110 P. 2d 
355. 
It is use to which it is put that renders 
property, otherwise lawful and rightful 
to have, use and possess, subject to seizure 
and forfeiture. Heraenway & Moser Co. 
v. Funk, 100 U. 72, 106 P. 2d 779. 
For general discussion of Fourth Amend-
ment to federal Constitution, see City of 
Price v. Jaynes, 113 U. 89, 191 P. 2d 606. 
Where police officers have obtained evi-
dence by illegal methods, such as an un-
lawful search in violation of this section, 
it should not be used to convict a person 
of crime. State v. Louden, 15 U. (2d) 64, 
387 P. 2d 240. 
Belying on tip, officers obtained per-
mission from proprietor of motel to enter 
defendant's room where they found a pis-
tol in a drawer which they identified as 
having been stolen in a burglary of a 
shopping center. After replacing the pistol 
in the drawer they waited outside for the 
return of the occupants of the motel room. 
The officers, on obtaining defendant's per-
mission to search the room, in addition to 
the pistol, found wrist watches and crow-
bars which also came from the shopping 
center. On the trial of defendant for sec-
ond degree burglary, trial court properly 
admitted evidence obtained during such 
search as the search was not unreasonable. 
State v. Louden, 15 U. (2d) 64, 337 P. 2d 
240. 
Whether a search and seizure is reason-
able is to be determined by the trial court, 
and evidence in plain view of the officer 
pursuing a felon may be rightfully seized 
and such seizure is not a violation of the 
federal constitutional protection as set 
forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 6 
L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 a Ct. 1684. State v. 
AHred, 16 U. (2d) 41, 395 P. 2d 535. 
Automobile search. 
Evidence taken from automobile de-
fendant was driving and subsequently 
used to convict him of burglary and 
grand larceny did not violate constitu-
tional proscription against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, even though taking 
was not connected with cause of arrest 
and was done without search warrant in 
view of facts that ear was lawfully taken 
into possession and impounded when de-
fendant was arrested for driving auto-
mobile which did not belong to him and 
without valid driver's license and since, 
under such circumstances, it was responsi-
bility of police impounding car to take 
inventory of its contents. State v. Criscola, 
21 U. (2d) 272, 444 P. 2d 517. 
City ordinance. 
City ordinance allegedly enacted pursu-
ant to powers granted by 10-8-50, provid-
ing that right of people of city "to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated," and making 
violation thereof misdemeanor, was void 
for vagueness and uncertainty in failing 
to define or prescribe standards to deter-
mine what acts constitute unreasonable 
searches or seizures. City of Price v. 
Jaynes, 113 U. 89, 191 P. 2d 606. 
Drugs. 
Marijuana taken during the search of 
defendant's home pursuant to warrant was 
unlawfully taken and evidence should 
have been suppressed on defendant's mo-
tion because search warrant was based 
on police officer's oral deposition rather 
than on oath or affirmation. State v. Jasso, 
21 U. (2d) 24, 439 P. 2d 844. 
liquor. 
Where police officers were investigating 
rooming house under eity ordinance to 
determine if liquor was being sold there, 
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